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Introduction 
The title of this paper may come across as somewhat presumptuous. To be clear, it is 
not about a radically different investment approach, or about a revolutionary new 
trading technology. Investing is about the future, however. Putting capital to work 
with the expectation of generating a future stream of income, or that the investment 
will appreciate in value over time.  
Global industrialization and population growth have a severe impact on the 
environment. As a result, food, energy supplies and healthcare resources are 
becoming in increasingly short supply, and hence more costly. Clearly, advanced 
solutions are crucial to maintain and expand a high quality of life. 
In this work, we take a look at a nascent science – with reportedly significant future 
potential – driven, in part, by the effects of environmental change. This new science, 
Synthetic Biology, can be defined as “the design and construction of new biological 
devices and systems for useful purposes”.  
This paper attempts to address the challenges of how to invest in Synthetic Biology 
firms, most of which are relatively new start-ups and unprofitable. Valuing an early-
stage firm with only a brief operating history, little or no operating profit (or even 
revenue), and an immature and untested business concept, could be a formidable 
challenge. For example, standard fundamental analysis is not only difficult, but also 
meaningless for businesses with negative earnings and/or cash flows. Buying shares 
in such untried, untested and relatively unknown companies would be risky and 
speculative. In the theoretical and more practice-oriented literature, the topic of 
evaluating emerging, promising, but still unprofitable companies, rarely appears. This 
paper suggests a number of criteria - some quantitative, but mostly qualitative – for 
the potential investor to consider before making the decision to buy shares in the 
company. 
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Synthetic Biology (SB). 
According to the Synthetic Biology Project (http://www.synbioproject.org), SB is 
“evolving so rapidly that no widely accepted definitions exist.” However, most would 
agree that, in the most general terms, Synthetic Biology is the design and construction 
of new biological parts, devices, and systems, and the re-design of existing, natural 
biological systems for useful purposes (Kotler, 2012). It is a growing enterprise, as 
scientists are increasingly able to successfully manipulate an organism’s genetic code, 
as well as taking the code from one organism and add it to another one.  
Synthetic Biology takes this one step further by creating completely new sequences of 
DNA, using computers and laboratory chemicals “to design organisms that do new 
things – like produce biofuels or excrete the precursors of medical drugs” 
(http://www.synbioproject.org). An example of the latter is the anti-malaria drug 
Artemisinin, which can now be produced – at a much lower cost - by using 
genetically-engineered yeast.  The technology to create microbial strains to produce 
artemisinic acid - a precursor of Artemisinin – was developed by Amyris 
(http://www.amyris.com) (see also below). 
What makes SB special? Rutherford (2013), points out that SB is uniquely suited to 
address global problems. That is to say, “engineered and constructed solutions” to the 
problems our planet faces, particularly in light of the effects of climate and 
environmental change. For example, in the areas of food and fuel production and the 
development of new synthetic medicines and vaccines. With these present and future 
creations, “we stand on the precipe of a new industrial revolution” (Rutherford, 2013, 
p.144). 
With an annual budget of $500 million, the Bioengineering Department at Stanford 
University (http://bioengineering.stanford.edu) is arguably the most important center 
for bioengineering in the U.S. Drew Endy, one of its faculty, estimates that today 2% 
of the US economy is derived from genetic engineering and synthetic biology, and 
that this proportion is growing at an annual rate of 12%. In terms of technology 
innovation and economic growth, synthetic biology will lead to a boom similar to the 




Possible hurdles on the path to acceptance and success of synthetic biology are 
primarily twofold, namely: dual-use research & applications and resistance by  
intermediate- and final consumers. Moreover, subsequent negative publicity could 
lead to greater regulation and trade restrictions. 
Through the centuries scientific discoveries and advancements have been used in 
heinous ways. As a recent example, in 2011, a Dutch researcher had found a way to 
turn H5N1(a highly contagious bird flu), into an equally contagious human-to-human 
influenza. As a point of reference, the 1918 flu pandemic killed 50 million people, so 
the potential for bioterrorism would be staggering (Garrett, 2013).  Noble (2013), 
offers a stark reminder that: The misuse of synthetic biology and similar pioneering 
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scientific technologies represents a multidimensional global threat…Therefore, it 
requires a coordinated international response. A coordinated response by 
governments, academia, health professionals, and law enforcement agencies. 
Public and industry acceptance of genetically-manipulated / bioengineered products is 
also far from certain. AquaBounty Technologies, a U.S. aquaculture company, has 
experienced overwhelming resistance from various special interest groups. The 
company managed to add a growth hormone gene from the Chinook salmon to the 
Atlantic salmon, which allows the latter to grow to market size in half the time of 
“regular” salmon.(http://aquabounty.com).  
Although, the FDA is expected to approve the product, environmental- and consumer 
organizations have voiced strong opposition to it. According to Friends of the Earth, 
nearly 2 million people - including scientists, fishermen, business owners, and 
consumers - have written to the FDA opposing the approval of genetically engineered 
salmon (http://www.foe.org).  
Conversely, in 2012, a group of 56 scientists, developers, and investors that support 
AquaBounty Technologies’ application to the FDA, sent a letter to President Obama 
asking for his help in removing the regulatory bottleneck that is holding up the review 
process (http://aquacomgroup.com). So, after almost 20 years of numerous tests and 
studies, the FDA will probably approve this incipient, genetically-engineered, food 
animal, and will likely not be labeled as such.  
More worrisome, especially for investors, is the growing list of more than 60 U.S. 
supermarket chains that will not sell the salmon. Still, AquaBounty remains optimistic, 
expecting that once consumers have an opportunity to see, feel, and taste the product, 
“they will wonder what all the fuss was about” (http://aquabounty.com). 
The fear of misuse (e.g. bioterrorism), consumer resistance, and a challenging 
regulatory environment are serious obstacles in this area. That is, the social, legal and 
ethical implications to use these technologies and products could inhibit the growth of 
the Synthetic Biology market. 
But, let us remind ourselves that we are investors. Individuals who employ capital 
with the expectation of a positive return. If we agree that Synthetic Biology firms 
have the potential to offer an opportunity to earn a decent return, the next question is 
how?  And more specifically, who? 
 
Synthetic Biology Companies 
Before looking into specific companies, let us be clear about the following.  First and 
foremost, note that the word “potential” is used here, as almost all of the newer, 
smaller listed SB companies have negative earnings. They are, therefore, difficult to 
value as possible candidates for investment. Caveat emptor: investing in businesses 
with negative earnings, or cash flow, is a high-risk proposition and should be avoided 
by the conservative investor.  
There are several other issues, such as the lack of (consistent) revenue. Sometimes, 
these new synthetic biology firms receive government subsidies and/or grants from 
private foundations, which of course cannot be considered sources of income. 
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Furthermore, these new firms usually “burn” cash as development costs keep 
mounting – building new (and often expensive!) facilities and logistic systems, 
buying equipment, developing the product(s), etc. Hence, most Synthetic Biology 
firms have negative cash flows. 
Obtaining bank loans is a major challenge for these companies. Contrary to what the 
Federal Reserve had hoped for at the beginning of the financial crisis, Western banks 
are still reluctant to issue loans, especially to these new (risky) firms. So how then 
will these companies obtain the necessary funds to keep the business afloat? By 
issuing corporate debt, and by issuing new shares. Given their precarious cash 
positions, these firms will be hard-pressed to make the interest payments (on a 
corporate bond), let alone pay back the principal on a bank loan. So, the only viable 
alternative is to issue new shares.  
However, this share dilution reduces the proportional ownership of existing 
shareholders in the company – not an attractive prospect for most investors. Warren 
Buffet points out that a shareholder is a part-owner of a business, and not simply 
someone who possesses a piece of paper. No owner likes to see his stake in the 
business being reduced. Creditors would probably not object for the company to keep 
raising equity, but shareholders are only willing to throw so much good money after 
bad. Finally, in order to attract and keep management talent, new companies issue 
stock options at extremely attractive prices to these individuals – but again, this 
comes at the expense of regular shareholders who pay full price. 
So, definitely potential, but possibly at a cost! 
 
Specific Companies. 
Now, let’s take a random look at a few listed companies working in Synthetic Biology 
space, namely: Amyris (AMRS); Intrexon (XON); Solazyme (SZYM); and Evolva 
(EVE:SWX). All these are US-based, except for Evolva which is a Swiss company. It 
is important to know is that these companies do not produce and market final products 
(the exception being Solazyme). Instead, they produce ingredients and/or offer 
platforms to other (often larger) so-called “partner companies”. Equally – if not more 
important – is the fact that none of these companies are profitable (yet). Again, please 
note that this article is for educational purposes only and should not be taken as an 
investment recommendation.  
Figure 1 below, depicts the stock prices for Intrexon (XON), Amyris (AMRS), and 
Solazyme (SZYM) over the past year. From October 2014, we see a clear divergence 
in the three stocks’ performance.  
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Figure 1. Stock prices for Intrexon (XON), Amyris (AMRS), and Solazyme (SZYM). 
01/2014 – 01/2015. 
According to the company website, Amyris is a renewable products company 
providing sustainable alternatives to a broad range of petroleum-sourced products. 
The company has “a desire to have a lasting positive impact on the planet”. Founded 
in 2003, Amyris applies its industrial synthetic biology platform to convert plant 
sugars into a variety of molecules - flexible building blocks that can be used in a wide 
range of products. (http://www.amyris.com)”. Its main product is Biofene, a 
renewable farnesene, that can be adapted to function as a viable substitute to fossil 
fuel-derived products, such as fuels, lubricants, polymers & plastic additives,  and 
cosmetics, among others. The company went public in 2010, with an IPO of $16 per 
share. One of the driving forces within the company is Jay Keasling, professor of 
bioengineering at UC Berkeley. Nonetheless, Amyris has yet to show a profit and the 
stock currently (January2015) trades at $1.86. Apparently, things work well in the lab, 
but large-scale commercialization is still years off (Rutherford, 2013). In all fairness, 
the price of crude oil has declined by more than half over the last 6 months, causing 
the benefits of using alternative fuels to decline accordingly. 
Intrexon (http://www.dna.com) was founded in 1998 and designs, builds, and 
regulates gene programs, which are DNA sequences that consist of key genetic 
components using its proprietary and complementary technologies (Yahoo Finance). 
Intrexon is active in five main areas: Health; Food; Energy; Consumer; and the 
Environment, using an Exclusive Channel Collaboration (ECC) business model. The 
company owns almost 60% of the aforementioned Aquabounty Technologies stock. 
Intrexon provides its ECC partners with industrial-scale design and development of 
complex biological systems through its proprietary UltraVector platform. Intrexon’s 
IPO took place only in mid-2013 at $16. The company is not yet profitable, but its 
shares traded as high as $38.50 (January 2014). Today (January 2015), it trades again 
at this level – more than twice the IPO price. 
Solazyme (http://solazyme.com) manufactures and sells renewable oils and other bio 
products. Its proprietary technology transforms plant-based sugars into triglyceride 
oils and other bio products (Yahoo Finance). Target markets for the use of their 
technology platform include fuels, chemicals, nutritionals, and skin and personal care 
products. Solazyme held its IPO in 2011 at $18 a share. The company is not profitable 
and its shares currently trade at $2.20. The effects of the sharp decline in crude oil 
prices apply here as well. 
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Our only European Synthetic Biology firm is Evolva (http://www.evolva.com). 
Founded in Switzerland in 2004, it produces ingredients (and provides technologies 
for making ingredients) to other companies, in particular in the food & beverage, 
consumer health and pharmaceutical sectors. For example, Evolva has succeeded in 
making the key individual components of the popular natural sweetener Stevia, 
through yeast fermentation, using low-cost plant sugars. In early 2013, the company 
entered into an agreement with Cargill to jointly develop and commercialize 
fermentation-derived steviol glycosides. Cargill is one of the largest privately-held 
companies in the world, with revenues well over $130 billion. It is these kinds of 
collaborative agreements that are essential for  synthetic biology companies to grow 
and prosper. The company went public as Evolva Holding in 2009 with an IPO of 
CHF 1.32 a share. In early 2014, the company issued 27 million new shares at CHF 
1.37 per share. Today it trades at CHF 1.47 while earnings remain negative. 
Earlier, we mentioned the phenomenon of share dilution. In February 2014, Evolva 
placed 27 million new shares. At its 2014 annual meeting, Intrexon asked its 
shareholders to approve an additional 3 million share issue. According to its proxy 
statement, the company believes “it has an insufficient number of outstanding shares 
to allow for adequate long-term equity incentives, as part of their executive 
compensation program”. In March 2014 Solazyme announced its intention to offer 
$100 million in convertible senior subordinated notes, as well as 5 million shares of 
its common stock “to fund capital expenditures, working capital and general corporate 
purposes”. Jim Cramer (a popular TV investment commentator) promptly rated the 
stock as a “Sell”.  
A Money-Losing Proposition? 
So, why would anybody invest in Synthetic Biology businesses?  Mostly, it appears to 
be a money-losing proposition. They are all burning cash, regularly issue new shares, 
and for their survival depend heavily on the continuous success of their collaborative 
arrangements with other firms.  
There are hundreds of listed companies that report losses quarter after quarter and 
only a few of those “hit the jackpot” and become highly-profitable, well-known 
names in their field. Staying within the Biotech space, the more intrepid investor is 
hoping to be to pick the next Amgen, Gilead Sciences, Celgene, or Novo Nordisk. 
These biotech companies – without exception – have become excellent businesses, 
richly rewarding their (especially early) shareholders. 
Like Heck & Rogers (2014) and Funk (2014), Rutherford (2013), also remains very 
optimistic going forward: “This manipulation of four billion years of evolution, 
specifically for the creation of unnatural biological tools, is potentially a revolution, 
one that is occurring right now” (p.181). He agrees with the United Nations’ 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and Lovelock (2014) that people 
– and by extension businesses – are not going to change their behavior in any 
significant way and therefore climate and environmental change are unavoidable. This, 
almost by necessity, will have an effect on how the Synthetic Biology industry will 
evolve over the next decades, in terms of scale and innovation. 
The question then remains: How do you assess the potential of these new businesses? 
How do you separate the wheat from the chaff? Traditional valuation methods e.g. 
 7 
those based on earnings and cash flows are, of course, meaningless. Here are some 
tentative suggestions: 
1). Are Total Revenues increasing? Is the Price/Sales ratio improving?  
2). What are the trends for Total Assets and Total Debt? 
3). Is the value and quality of the Collaborative Agreements increasing? 
4). Market Size and Market Growth for the company’s product(s). 
5). Competition and Barriers to Entry. 
6). Are Earnings Per Share (EPS) “improving”, i.e. is the negative number 
consistently getting smaller? 
7). Analysts’ Estimates & Opinions. Although of some value, we should of course be 
aware of the inherent conflicts with Sell-Side research. That is, analysts like to keep 
their jobs and their client base. The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) 
(http://www.finra.org) lists five “conflicts that analysts may face, as they develop and 
offer their opinions in research reports”: Investment Banking Relationships; Analyst 
Compensation; Brokerage Commissions; Buy-Side Pressures; and Ownership 
Interests in the Company. The message is clear: Do your own homework! 
 
In addition, there are several qualitative criteria one could consider when valuing a 
loss-making business (Bacher, 2014). These would include, but are not limited to:  
8).Who are the Founding Team members and who is running the business now? The 
quality of the management team is one of Warren Buffett’s key investing tenets -  
management that keeps in mind the concerns of the shareholders.  
9). Does the company have a technical and intellectual history, or did it start from 
scratch?  
10). What is the company’s business model?  Collaborative agreements with much 
larger enterprises (e.g. for commercialization purposes) appears to be the standard 
model for most Synthetic Biology firms.  SB companies typically get compensated 
through payment for technology-access fees, royalties, milestones, and the 
reimbursement of certain costs. In theory, this model allows them to leverage their 
know-how, capital, and other resources across a potentially wider scope of products 
and markets than would be possible without collaboration. 
11). Who are the current investors in the company? Founders, institutional investors, 
hedge funds, well-known individual investors? What is their background, technical 
expertise, overall performance, etc.?  
12). Commercialization Prospects. Commercialization is the final stage of the new 
product development process (Cooper, 2011). It involves bringing the final product 
successfully to market. However, a Synthetic Biology firm rarely brings a final 
product to a final buyer. Instead, it offers a technology-platform, or perhaps a vital 
ingredient, to a collaborating partner company. Thus, by definition, 
commercialization is limited to establishing the largest possible number of alliances. 
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Valuing early-stage businesses is a subjective, and hence precarious undertaking, as 
the focus tends to be more on qualitative rather than quantitative information. Still, 
these companies with negative earnings and cash flows are often found in industries, 
such as alternative energy, robotics, and biotech, where the potential reward can far 
outweigh the risk. In the next part of this paper, we will “apply” the above twelve 
valuation criteria to a specific US-listed company. For this we have selected – for 
illustrative purposes only – INTREXON (ticker = XON). Intrexon was chosen from 
the companies listed above, because it was the only one with a current stock price still 
trading well above its IPO.  
Also, as a US exchange-listed company, financial data and other important company 
information is more readily available and reliable than a non-US firm. It should be 
pointed out that today, with the  Internet as a global investment platform (Choffray & 
Pahud de Mortanges, 2014), the investor has a plethora of free analytical tools at his 
disposal, from websites such as Yahoo Finance, MSN Money, NASDAQ and 
especially the Securities & Exchange Commision (SEC). 
To ensure a certain level of availability and reliability the main source of information 
used, is obtained from the company filings with the SEC, primarily Forms 10-K 
(Annual Report), 10-Q (Quarterly Report) and 8-K (unscheduled material events, or 





Intrexon describes itself as “a leader in synthetic biology”, focused on working with 
other companies through exclusive collaboration partnerships in the health, food, 
energy, and environment sectors to create new bio-genetically-engineered products 
that improve the quality of life as well as the planet’s health” (http://www.dna.com). 
Intrexon aims to create value from use of its biotech platforms across different 
industries and partner companies. A very ambitious proposition, to say the least. So, 
let’s take a closer look at Intrexon in an attempt to “analyze” this company – both 
from a (very limited) quantitative and from a somewhat more elaborate qualitative 
perspective, following the above list of 12 suggestions. 
1). Are Total Revenues increasing? Year-on-year, Intrexon grew revenues 70.63% 
from $13.93m. to $23.76m., while net income improved from a loss of $81.87m. to a 
smaller loss of $38.98m. over the past 3 years. A positive development.  
The Price/Sales ratio of Intrexon on May 5, 2014 is 44.67, based on trailing 12 month 
sales, which is close to its average of 46.88. Investors are willing to pay, on average, 
almost $47 for every dollar the business generates in sales. That seems exceedingly 
high, given that today’s P/S ratio is only 1.68 for the S&P 500 and 10.27 for the 
Biotech industry as a whole (http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/). To compare, 
Solazyme’s P/S is 18, Amyris P/S is 5.87. Based on this ratio, buying Intrexon stock 
can be considered extremely risky. 
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2). What are the trends for Total Assets and Total Debt? Intrexon Corp uses little 
debt in its capital structure as supported by a debt to capital ratio of 0.44%, compared 
to 1.37 for the S&P 500 and 0.68 for the Biotech & Drug industry as a whole. Current 
Ratio is 9.46.  Less debt equals less risk, as the company funds it projects mostly 
through equity instead of through bank loans and/or corporate bonds. This is in line 
with what we discussed above, i.e. the difficulty companies are having in the current 
environment obtaining bank loans, especially untried and untested, loss-making firms. 
3). Is the value of their collaborative agreements increasing?  Intrexon brings its 
products to market through Exclusive Channel Collaborations (ECCs). According to 
their SEC Filing 10-K (2013), they had 20 active ECCs in the fields of healthcare and 
foods. Intrexon Collaboration revenues have increased almost threefold from 
$8,013,000 (2011) to $23,760,000 (2013). This is a positive development. However, 
the company’s growth prospects depend to a large extent on its ECC partners' 
successes, and the company will surely feel the impact from any key partner's failure. 
Also, the quality of the ECC’s has been put into question, however their ECC with 
Johnson & Johnson has been seen as a positive development in this regard. Still, as of 
March 2014, There have been no commercialized products derived from the 
Intrexon’s collaborations. 
4). Market Size and Market Growth for Synthetic Biology products in general. 
The global market for Synthetic Biology generated $233.8 million in 2008. According 
to a market study by Transparency Market Research, the global Synthetic Biology 
market was valued at $1.8 billion in 2012 and is expected to reach $13.4 billion in 
2019 - growing at a CAGR of 32.6% from 2013 to 2019. Interestingly, Europe holds 
the maximum market share, and is expected to maintain its lead position in terms of 
revenue. EU governments and private organizations are the major driving force for 
continued growth of the Synthetic Biology market 
http://www.transparencymarketresearch.com/synthetic-biology-market.html). This is 
a positive factor for Intrexon. 
5). Competition & Barriers to Entry. The market for synthetic biology is segmented 
by products, by technologies and by applications. Different levels of competition and 
different entry barriers exist for these three segments. Intrexon does not market final 
products, but sees itself a leader in Scientific Biology applications. These applications 
are based on proprietary & complementary technologies, that are difficult to replicate 
for new entrants, which it “markets” through ECCs. 
Intrexon does not have direct competitors, i.e. those who offer similar technologies 
and applications. Competition is, therefore, more indirect coming from large 
industrial companies who may develop their own methods and products. This is a 
business with strong patent protection worldwide, raising barriers to entry. 
6). Earnings Per Share (EPS). Although EPS was still negative for 2013, it has 
become significantly less so over the past 3 years. Intrexon reported annual 2013 
losses of $ -1.40 per share. Year-on-year, growth in Earnings Per Share excluding 
extraordinary items increased 92.54%. On May 07, 2014, the company reported 1st 
quarter 2014 earnings of $0.04 per share – missing analysts’estimates by $0.02. 
7). Analysts’Estimates & Opinions. As of May 02, 2014, the consensus forecast 
amongst four investment analysts is that the company will outperform the market. 
Twelve-month price targets for Intrexon have a median target of $31.00, with a high 
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estimate of $40.00 and a low estimate of $18.00. The median estimate represents a 
96.70% increase from the May 9, 2014 price of $15.76. 
8). Founders and Current Management. The company was founded 1998 by 
Thomas Reed Ph.D., a molecular geneticist. Dr. Reed is the company’s Chief Science 
Officer and a Company Director since 1998. The other 12 executive officers were 
appointed more recently – between 2007 and 2014. Four executive officers hold a 
Ph.D. in various relevant fields and one holds an MD degree. Possibly significant is 
the background of the current CEO & Chairman of the Board, Randal J. Kirk. He has 
a successful track record as a biotech entrepreneur and investor, who also owns about 
64% of Intrexon shares. According to one Biotech publication, Kirk has kept Intrexon 
well funded and is busily securing deals with a constellation of players in drug 
development, aquaculture, animal health and agriculture”. Or, using a Warren Buffett 
phrase, Mr. Kirk has considerable “skin in the game”. 
It could thus be said that Randal J. Kirk is by far the key player who “runs the show” 
at Intrexon. In the SEC Form 10-K (2013) filing it is stated that….We have 
historically been controlled, managed and principally funded by Randal J. Kirk, our 
Chief Executive Officer, and affiliates of Mr. Kirk. As of December 31, 2013, Mr. Kirk 
and shareholders affiliated with him beneficially owned approximately 64 percent of 
our voting stock. Mr. Kirk is able to control or significantly influence all matters 
requiring approval by our shareholders, including the election of directors and the 
approval of mergers or other business combination transactions. The interests of Mr. 
Kirk may not always coincide with the interests of other shareholders, and he may 
take actions that advance his personal interests and are contrary to the desires of our 
other shareholders….. 
Is there a potential conflict of interest here?....Intrexon has engaged in a variety of 
transactions with companies in which Mr. Kirk and affiliates of Mr. Kirk have an 
interest. To put investors minds at ease….We [Intrexon] believe that each of these 
transactions was on terms no less favorable to us than terms we could have obtained 
from unaffiliated third parties, and each of these transactions was approved by at 
least a majority of the disinterested members of our board of directors. But still, with 
respect to Intrexon stock…If Mr. Kirk or any of his affiliates were to sell a substantial 
portion of the shares they hold, it could cause our stock price to decline.  
So, for Intrexon, it would behoove an investor to “keep a close eye” on Mr. Kirk and 
his insider transactions. Kirk has been described as one of the most successful 
healthcare leaders of all time (Chase, 2014) and investors might be tempted to 
replicate his transactions, because of his impressive track record with previous 
investments. Be that as it may, investors should also ask, what would happen to the 
company if Randal Kirk were no longer there? 
9). Technical & Intellectual history. Intrexon was founded by Thomas D. Reed in 
1998, while still a Ph.D. candidate, and has no prior technical, or intellectual history. 
All proprietary technology and intellectual property was started from scratch. 
10). The company’s business model. Intrexon’s business model is to commercialize 
their technologies through Exclusive Channel Collaborations, or ECCs, with 
collaborators that have industry expertise, development resources and sales and 
marketing capabilities to bring new and improved products and processes to market. 
Although still largely untested, this model seems to work well for Intrexon, as most of 
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their revenues are derived from ECCs. Moreover, it can focus on research and 
development of platforms without having to spend considerable capital on 
commercialization. In such situations, technical risk is greater than market risk 
(Bacher, 2014). 
Apart from what was already mentioned in 3), what are the drawbacks of Intrexon’s 
ECC model? First of all, there is a time lag between the granting of the initial license 
to enable Intrexon technologies, and when a stream of royalty payments begins, as 
this is dependent upon the colloborators’ abilities and time needed to successfully 
develop and commercialize their own products. Several ECCs are established through 
the efforts of Randal Kirk and have been “allowed” to pay for Intrexon’s technology 
with their own shares, increasing Intrexon’s exposure to the risks inherent in the 
collaborators’ business. Also, stock is not the same as cash. Except in limited 
circumstances, Intrexon does not have the right to terminate an ECC agreement.  
There was a concern that Intrexon’s ECCs were mostly smaller, relatively unknown 
companies. However, Intrexon recently announced a collaboration with Johnson & 
Johnson, for advancing new skin and hair care products 
(http://www.dna.com/consumer/collaborations/JohnsonJohnson). 
In their SEC Form 10-K filing (Annual Report), Intrexon lists a considerable number 
of risks associated with the ECC business model (https://www.sec.gov). It should be 
noted, however, that these risks would seem inherent in all organizations that employ 
business models with significant collaborative elements and these types of risks are 
not unique to Intrexon. 
11). Who are the current investors in the company. First and foremost CEO & 
Chairman Randal J. Kirk and his affiliates own 64% of the shares. During the third 
quarter of 2013, David Einhorn’s hedge fund Greenlight Capital bought 2,176,868 
Intrexon shares, representing 0.9% of Greenlight’s portfolio. Dan Loeb’s Third Point 
hedge fund acquired 2.17 million shares in 2011, when the company was still private. 
According to his Q4 2013 Letter, Loeb has continued to accumulate Intrexon stock 
since its August 2013 IPO. At a more modest level, T. Boone Pickens ( a well-known 
takeover artist during the 1980s) bought 12,000 shares in September 2013. For a more 
extensive overview of hedge fund holdings of Intrexon stock see: 
http://www.insidermonkey.com/insider-
trading/company/intrexon+corp/1356090/hedge-funds/ 
Overall institutional ownership for Intrexon shares is 80.74% 
(http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/xon/institutional-holdings). Stocks with high 
institutional ownership could be attractive on the assumption that financial institutions 
will be longer-term shareholders. Still, larger institutional owners obviously have the 
potential to create and destroy value for individual investors. Consequently, it is 
imperative that investors follow closely and react effectively, to the moves the stock's 
biggest players are making. 
Insider buying: Conventional wisdom states that if insiders (e.g. company officers) 
are buying the stock, it is a positive indicator. It is assumed that people within the 
company know the current business environment and the future prospects of the 
business better than anyone else. For example, at a recent price dip CEO & Chairman 
Randal Kirk bought an additional 65,173 shares.  
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12). Commercialization Prospects. As mentioned before, Intrexon does not 
commercialize any products itself. Instead, it relies on partners through Exclusive 
Channel Collaborations (ECCs). ECCs obtain exclusive access to Intrexon’s 
proprietary technologies for use in the development and commercialization of  their 
own products and/or treatments. The SEC 10-K (2013) filing states that none of the 
company’s collaborators has received marketing approval, or has commercialized any 
products, enabled by Intrexon technologies. Intrexon expects the first revenues from 
commercialized products by 2015. 
Intrexon first important successful commercialization would, most likely, be 
Aquabounty salmon, given its imminent FDA approval. In general, food and 
healthcare are the first areas that have achieved initial promise of  market success.  In 
healthcare,  programs in oncology, anti-infectives, antibiotics, and tissue repair have 
resulted in some high-profile collaborations.   
Intrexon is also in the process of establishing collaborations in the areas of energy and 
the environment. In energy, the company has formed Intrexon Energy Partners (IEP). 
IEP’s first target product is isobutanol for gasoline blending.   With respect to the 
environment, Intrexon entered into a joint R&D agreement with Rentokil Initial PLC 
(http://www.rentokil-initial.com)that may lead to a new generation of pest control 
products (http://www.dna.com).       
 
Business Valuation using Monte Carlo Simulation. 
The purpose of this paper was to suggest several – mostly qualitative – approaches to 
value an early-stage enterprise, with only a brief operating history, little or no revenue 
and/or operating profit, and an immature and untested business model. However, for 
more quantitavely-inclined investors, familiar with advanced statistical analysis, there 
is a method which can address real-world uncertainties by modeling future results in 
complex and unpredictable situations.  
Monte Carlo Simulation is a multivariate modeling technique that allows 
investors/analysts to run multiple trials and define potential outcomes of an event or 
investment. As such, it does not produce a single-value answer (Razgaitis, 2009). 
Instead, a Monte Carlo simulation creates a probability distribution, or risk 
assessment, for a given investment under review. 
(http://www.investopedia.com/articles/financial-theory/08/monte-carlo-multivariate-
model.asp). 
According to Evergreen Advisors: Monte Carlo Simulation “is useful when valuing 
early-stage businesses because it provides the ability to estimate value, based on a 
statistical analysis of several uncertain but correlated future events.” 
It is beyong the scope of this paper to perform a Monte Carlo Simulation for the 
company Intrexon. However, Evergreen Advisors offers the following basic example: 
Assume we are valuing a technology start-up, and management has identified the 
drivers of its profitability as gross profit margin, product price and volume of sales. 
We then make underlying assumptions regarding key parameters: the discount rate, 
value range constraints, type of probability distribution, the variables in question and 
correlations between variables. These assumptions and variables are then analyzed 
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with an algorithm, yielding an array of conclusions which provides an estimation of 
the most likely outcomes, as well as insight into the probability of unanticipated 
events. In this example, a simulation of 50,000 random trials resulted in probability-
based estimates for revenue, profit margin, and earnings growth. Whereas the lack of 
operating history and unproven concept would ordinarily make forecasting an overly 
speculative exercise, we now have a statistical basis for projecting future results and 
developing a cash flow forecast. The results of Monte Carlo simulations are presented 






So, what have learned? Identifying new companies, with cutting-edge technologies 
and innovative approaches to solving today’s problems, can be one of the most 
rewarding pursuits for the individual investor. Especially, if the company in question 
later turns out to be hugely successful, which implies to “get in” early. Intrexon is a 
perfect example: a risky stock “surrounded by several indicators of success” going 
forward (Chase, 2014). Prima facie, Intrexon also faces far too many uncertainties for 
most people. Therefore, it is imperative that an investor makes a serious effort to 
understand the business well enough to be comfortable in risking his money. 
Extensive due diligence is of the essence! 
Investing in businesses with mostly negative fundamentals is a risky proposition, but 
by using appropriate valuation techniques an investor stands a better chance of 
reducing the current risk and reap future rewards. 
In this paper we have suggested a very limited number of quantitative, and a larger 
number of qualitative criteria. An investor may consider these when faced with 
analyzing a new untried and untested business, but one he/she believes has 
considerable potential for success in the future. Qualitative criteria were added 
because the investor will, most likely, be faced with negative earnings, a limited 
company history and very few comparables. Regular fundamental analysis would, 
therefore, be almost meaningless because of mostly negative results. Moreover, most 
models depend on positive earnings growth to make projections for the future. Even if 
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we have a fairly good idea of what drives value the most, it is based on (uncertain) 
future growth. Investors who attempt to value such a business with an emphasis on 
qualitative data will be better prepared for the volatility that comes with investing in 
these stocks.  
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